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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EAVES-
DROPPING - TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL 
AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968: A SEARCH WITHOUT A 
WARRANT? DALIA u. UNITED STATES, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
In Dalia u. United States,i the United States Supreme Court held 
that Congress, in enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,2 gave the courts authority to approve 
covert entries of private premises for purposes of installing eaves-
dropping devices. In addition, the Court held that law enforcement 
agents who obtain Title III authorization to conduct electronic 
surveillance have implicit authority to enter the target premises 
surreptitiously to install the necessary devices. This casenote 
surveys the history of eavesdropping law as developed by the 
Supreme Court, focusing on Dalia and the federal legislation under 
which it was decided. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Protection against invasion of "the sanctity of a man's home and 
the privacies of life" was specifically provided in the fourth and fifth 
amendments. 3 Since the adoption of the Constitution, subtler and 
more intrusive means of invading privacy have become available as 
technological advances have made it possible for the government to 
disclose in the courtroom what is whispered in the bedroom.4 In 
response, the courts have interpreted the Constitution as providing 
protection for spoken words which were intended to remain private. 
The myriad devices used to eavesdrop5 may be divided into two 
categories. The first includes devices capable of intercepting oral 
1. 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title III]. 
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
4. Technological developments in electronics allow virtually indetectable eaves-
dropping to be conducted via such diverse mechanisms as transitors, micro-
circuits, and lasers. This new electronic technology is able to break through 
physical barriers and provide a sophisticated means for intercepting oral 
communications. Developments in miniaturization electronics allow such 
devices, many of which are smaller and thinner than a postage stamp, to be 
concealed in such unobtrusive places as behind wallpaper, within playing cards, 
or within light bulbs. See generally E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 5-20 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as LONG]; Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitu-
tional Development from Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 513,514 (1968>-
5. Sir William Blackstone defined "eavesdroppers," as persons who 
listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after 
discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, 
[and] are a common nuisance, and presentable at the court-leet, or are 
indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding sureties 
for their good behavior. 
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *168 (footnotes omitted). 
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communications without physical entry of the premises on which the 
conversations are taking place. The most widely used device within 
this group is the wiretap.6 Wiretaps are capable of intercepting only 
telegraphic and telephonic communications. The second category of 
eavesdropping devices includes those which must be physically 
installed on the target premises. Representative of this type are 
"bugs," tiny microphones capable of picking up whispers within a 
room and broadcasting them to listeners a half-mile away.7 
While Title III undoubtedly authorizes the use of both categories 
of devices,s it left unresolved two issues regarding the legality of an 
agent's entry of the target premises to install the devices. These 
issues, which were finally resolved in Dalia, were whether Congress 
intended to permit secret entries of private premises to install 
eavesdropping devices, and if so, whether law enforcement agents 
who obtain a valid Title III order have implied permission to enter 
the target premises to install the devices necessary to effectuate that 
order.9 An understanding of Dalia's import for these issues is 
facilitated by a review of Supreme Court decisions on eavesdropping. 
6. Wiretapping is the interception of telephone communications. It normally 
involves a physical entry into a telephone circuit, but not into the premises 
where the telephone to be tapped is located. Because law enforcement officers 
must know the cable number before they can tap a telephone line, it is usually 
necessary for them to seek assistance from the telephone company. E. LAPIDUS, 
EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 3-5, 123-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LAPIDUS]. See 
generally M. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING (1977); C. 
FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING (1978). For a discussion of the 
continuing need for wiretapping, see Rogers, The Case for Wiretapping, 63 YALE 
L. J. 792 (1954). 
7. "Bugging" is the overhearing of conversations emanating from a defined area 
by means of electronic devices without the necessity of penetrating a wire. 
LAPIDUS, supra note 6, at 4. See generally S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, 
THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959) [hereinafter cited as DASH]. 
8. 18 U.S.C. * 2518(3) (1970). Title III prohibits the interception of oral and wire 
communications with the exception of interceptions by duly authorized law 
enforcement officials. ld. at * 2511. Congress clearly evinced the intent to 
ensure that Title III authority would be used with restraint and that 
surveillance requiring the interception of communications would not be used 
routinely as the initial step in criminal investigation. United States v. 
Giordano, 416 U.s. 505 (1974>' Title III has repeatedly been held to be 
constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(withstood constitutional attack based on fourth amendment); State v. Siegel, 
266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972) (same>. 
Maryland has enacted a statute providing for the procedures to be followed 
for the interception of oral and wire communications by state officials. MD. CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., ** 10-401 to -412 0980>' For an excellent comparison 
of Title III and Maryland's corresponding legislation, see Gilbert, A Diagnosis, 
Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland's New Wiretap and Electronic Surveil-
lance Law, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1979). 
9. Congress' silence on the issue of covert entries to install eavesdropping devices 
has been repeatedly noted. E.g., United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456-57 
(9th Cir. 1978>. For a thorough discussion of the question of whether Congress 
intended to authorize entries, see McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious 
Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After The Court 
Says "Yes',?, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as McNamara]. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court first discussed the constitutionality of 
eavesdropping in Olmstead v. United States. lO Telephone conversa-
tions between Olmstead and others had been intercepted by law 
enforcement agents who were subsequently permitted to testify to 
the conversations at trial. Despite the officers' failure to obtain a 
search warrant, the Court held that the defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights had not been violated because wiretapping did not 
constitute a "search and seizure."ll It reasoned that the fourth 
amendment was intended to apply only to material things, and thus 
did not protect oral communications. The Court did note, however, 
that if the interception of the conversations had been accompanied by 
a physical trespass on the defendant's premises, those conversations 
would have been constitutionally protected. 
Subsequent to Olmstead, Congress enacted the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934 which provided that "no person not being 
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication."l2 The 
Act was first applied in Nardone v. United States. l3 In Nardone, the 
primary evidence used to convict the defendant consisted of testi-
mony by federal agents who had intercepted his telephone conversa-
tions. The Government contended that Congress, in enacting the 
Federal Communications Act, did not intend to prohibit wiretapping 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court looked to the plain wording of the Act which prohibited all 
interceptions. The Court reversed Nardone's conviction, holding that 
10. 277 U.S. 438 (928). 
11. The fourth amendment provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the majority in Olmstead, stated that "Itlhe 
reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument 
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and 
that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not 
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment." 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, thought the Court construed the fourth amend-
ment too strictly. In his view that amendment applied to all governmental 
invasions of privacy. 
12. 47 U.S.C. ~ 605 (1934) (current version at 47 U.s.C. § 605 (SUpp. 1979»). For a 
discussion of wiretapping under ~ 605 and the development of case law decided 
under that provision, see DASH, supra note 7, at 386-406,411-16. 
13. 302 U.S. 379 (1937>. 
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when evidence is obtained in violation of statute the proper remedy 
is exclusion of the evidence at trial. I4 
In 1940, in Goldman v. United States/5 the Court further 
addressed the constitutionality of eavesdropping. Federal agents had 
installed a detectaphonel6 on the outer wall of an office enabling 
them to overhear incriminating statements made by the defendant. 
At trial the agents were permitted to testify concerning those 
statements. The Supreme Court noted initially that the Federal 
Communications Actl7 was inapplicable because there was no 
"interception" within the meaning of the Act. Affirming the 
conviction, the Court held that the use of a detectaphone does not 
violate the fourth amendment because such a device does not require 
a trespass or illegal entry. IS 
In On Lee v. United States/9 the Court again refused to find that 
oral communications were protected by the fourth amendment. In 
14. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court denying 
petitioner's request to question the prosecution as to its use of the information 
obtained as a result of the illegal wiretap. Nardone v. United States, 106 F.2d 
41 (2d Cir. 1939). The Supreme Court again reversed petitioner's conviction, 
holding that to exclude the exact words of petitioner's conversations while 
admitting evidence derived therefrom would frustrate the policy announced in 
the original opinion. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The Court 
further ruled that the trial court must give petitioner the opportunity to prove 
that a substantial portion of the evidence against him was the fruit of a 
poisonous tree. [d. at 341. 
In Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), the Court extended 
Nardone to exclude from a federal trial evidence obtained by state police in 
violation of the Federal Communications Act. This result was reached despite 
the fact that the state police had acted pursuant to a state statute authorizing 
wiretapping. The Court found that Congress did not intend to permit state 
legislation to contradict the terms of the Federal Act. Cf Schwartz v. Texas, 
344 U.s. 199 (1952) (evidence obtained in violation of the Federal Communica-
tions Act is admissible in a state criminal trial). 
15. 316 U.S. 128 (1940). 
16. A detectaphone is a device with a receiver so delicate that when placed against 
a partition wall it is capable of picking up sound waves emanating from the 
other side. [d. at 131. The sound waves are amplified to enable the user to 
overhear the conversations taking place on the other side of the wall. 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. 1979), 
18. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy argued that the fourth amendment 
should not be given such a literal interpretation and that the use of a 
detectaphone was an unreasonable search and seizure. Justice Murphy was 
concerned that the innovation of new intercepting devices required increased 
protection from intrusive governmental action. The fourth amendment should 
therefore receive a construction sufficiently elastic to enable it to serve the 
needs of modern life. For a discussion of the development of new electronic 
devices capable of intercepting communications, see LONG, supra note 4, at 
5-20. 
19. 343 U.s. 747 (1951) (5-4 decision). 
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that case, narcotics agents instructed a former employee of the 
defendant to engage the latter in a conversation likely to result in 
incriminating statements. The agents were able to overhear the 
ensuing conversation by planting a microphone on the former 
employee. The Court held that the fourth amendment was no more 
violated than if the agents had merely been eavesdropping through 
an open window. The dissent, however, thought the conversations 
should have been excluded at trial. The fundamental principle 
espoused in the dissent was that fourth amendment protections are 
not limited to the seizure of tangible items, but extend to intangibles 
such as spoken words.20 
Beginning in 1954, the Court indicated that a police trespass on 
private premises without a warrant for the purpose of installing 
listening devices violates the fourth amendment. In Irvine v. 
California,21 state police officers surreptitiously entered defendant's 
home to install listening devices. Incriminating statements were 
intercepted and subsequently admitted at trial. The Supreme Court, 
relying exclusively on the police trespass, found that "few police 
measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliber-
ately, and persistently violate the fundamental principle declared by 
the Fourth Amendment."22 The Court thereby rejected its previous 
position that the fourth amendment protects only "tangible" objects. 
The conviction was nevertheless affirmed because the exclusionary 
rule was not then binding upon the states.23 
Subsequently, in Silverman v. United States,24 the Court 
reversed a conviction based upon evidence obtained by the use of a 
20. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, expressed the same concern over technological 
advances in eavesdropping devices as did Justice Brandeis in Olmstead and 
Justice Murphy in Goldman. Justice Frankfurter noted that "[tlhe circum-
stances of the present case show how the rapid advances of science are made 
available for that police intrusion into our private lives against which the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was set on guard." Id. at 759. 
21. 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (5-4 decision). 
22. Id. at 132. 
23. The exclusionary rule. announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914). mandates that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution be 
excluded at trial. The Court, however, at first refused to apply the rule to the 
states. Wolfv. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (in a prosecution in state court for a 
state crime the fourth amendment does not forbid admission of evidence 
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure). In Irvine, the Court specifically 
declined to overrule Wolf Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (in a 
state court for a state crime evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search of 
defendant's person, accompanied by physical force, must be excluded under the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments). The holding in Wolf was finally overruled 
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which the Court held that "all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is 
. . . inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655. Thus, there is no question that 
Irvine would be decided differently today. 
24. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
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"spike-mike."25 Employing this device, which made physical contact 
with a heating duct serving the premises occupied by petitioner, law 
enforcement officers were able to overhear incriminating statements 
relating to an illegal gambling operation. The defendant urged the 
Court to reconsider Olmstead, Goldman, and Lee. The Court found it 
unnecessary, however, to reconsider its prior decisions. It reversed on 
the ground that the eavesdropping was accomplished by an actual 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area - the spike-mike 
touched the heating duct. The Court held that "[e]avesdropping 
accomplished by means of such physical intrusion is beyond the pale 
of even those decisions in which a closely divided court has held that 
eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic means did not 
amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights."26 Although the 
Silverman Court found it unnecessary to reconsider the Olmstead 
doctrine that the fourth amendment does not protect oral communi-
cations,27 that doctrine was explicitly rejected the following year in 
Wong Sun v. United States. 28 In that case the Court explained that 
"[i]t follows from our holding in Silverman that the Fourth Amend-
ment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as 
well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects.' "29 
Thus, the protection granted by the fourth amendment was finally 
extended to include spoken words. 
25. A "spike-mike" is a microphone with a footlong spike attached to an amplifier 
and earphones. Id. at 506. In Silverman, the spike was iriserted into a crevice in 
a wall until it made contact with a heating duct which acted as a sounding 
board. 
26. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961). The Court was 
referring to On Lee v. United States, 343 U.s. 747 (1951), and Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 128 (1940). 
27. Although Olmstead was not expressly rejected, the Court in Silverman used 
broad language indicating a change in position from the early eavesdropping 
cases. For example, the Court proclaimed that the fourth amendment stands for 
"the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 511 (l961l. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886). 
Justice Douglas, concurring in Silverman, suggested that the majority's 
distinction between Goldman and Silverman was artificial. That the latter 
involved a physical trespass and the former did not should make no dif-
ference because the invasion of privacy in both cases was the same. Agreeing 
with the Court that local trespass law was of no significance, Justice Douglas 
further stated that there should be no distinctions based on the type of 
electronic surveillance employed. The sole concern was whether the privacy of 
the individual was invaded. Because it was, and no search warrant was issued, 
the conviction must be set aside. 
28. 371 U.S. 471 (1963), Accord, Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), where 
Justice Brennan noted that "[w]e have held that the fruits of electronic 
surveillance, though intangible, nevertheless are within the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment." [d. at 460 (dissenting opinion) (citing Irvine and 
Silverman>. 
29. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963>. 
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In Berger v. New York,30 the Court invalidated New York's 
eavesdropping statute31 by holding that it failed to comply with 
fourth amendment standards.32 In striking down the New York 
statute, the Court set forth exacting guidelines to be followed if a 
wiretap statute were to pass constitutional muster. Among the 
Berger requirements were: (1) a neutral and detached magistrate 
must approve the application for authority to wiretap and issue the 
order for surveillance; (2) the application must show probable cause 
that an offense has been or is being committed; (3) the warrant must 
state with particularity the offense being investigated; (4) the 
authorization period must be less than sixty days; (5) the surveil-
lance must not continue beyond the seizure of the conversations 
sought; and (6) there must be a return of the warrant and all seized 
materials to the issuing magistrate.33 Although the significance of 
Berger lies in the Court's strong language, which indicated its 
disfavor and concern over the use of eavesdropping devices,34 the 
Court did state that under specific conditions and circumstances the 
use of such devices would be constitutionaJ.35 
Several months later, the Supreme Court decided the landmark 
case of Katz v. United States. 36 In Katz, the Government was 
permitted to introduce into evidence the defendant's end of telephone 
30. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
31. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. * 813(a) (Supp. 1967>. 
32. At the time Berger was decided it was firmly established that the fourth 
amendment was enforceable against the states through the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961l. Further, the 
standards of reasonableness required under the fourth amendment are the 
same under the fourteenth. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963). 
33. Congress carefully followed the guidelines enunciated in Berger when it enacted 
Title III. See Note, The 1977 Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 
Act, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 374, 374-75 (978), See also Note, Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping Under the Fourth Amendment - After Berger and Katz, 17 BUH'Al.o L. 
REV. 455, 460-61 (1968). 
34. The language used by the Court illustrates a complete departure from the 
position taken in Olmstead which was finally overruled in Berger. In particular, 
the Court emphasized that eavesdropping "involves an intrusion on privacy 
that is broad in scope," and that the Court cannot "forgive the requirements of 
the fourth amendment in the name of law enforcement." 388 U.S. 41, 56, 62 
0967>. See also Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (the basic 
purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government). 
35. The Government argued that the Court's holding rendered it impossible to draft 
an eavesdropping statute that would meet the requirements of the fourth 
amendment. The Court stated, however, that eavesdropping may be constitu-
tional under precise and discriminate guidelines. Specifically. it noted that 
"[tlhe Fourth Amendment does not make the 'precincts of the home or the office 
... sanctuaries where the law can never reach ... .' .. Berger v. New York. 
388 U.S. 41. 63 (1967) (quoting Warden v. Hayden. 387 U.S. 294. 321 (1967) 
(Douglas. J .. dissenting)). 
36. 389 U.S. 347 11967L 
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calls that were overheard by FBI agents who had attached an 
electronic listening device to the outside of the public telephone 
booth from which he made his calls. The defendant was convicted of 
transmitting wagering information. The court of appeals affirmed 
because "there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by 
[Katz]."37 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence 
was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment and that the 
"trespass" standard was no longer controlling.38 In discarding the 
idea that the fourth amendment applies only to "constitutionally 
protected areas," Justice Stewart held that "the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places" and that "the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion into any given enclosure."39 Once it was established that 
there had been a "search and seizure," the Court addressed the issue 
of whether the search and seizure complied with constitutional 
standards. The Government contended that its agents acted in a 
defensible manner.40 The agents did not begin surveillance until 
there was a strong probability that the defendant was using the 
telephone for illegal purposes, and the surveillance was limited to 
obtaining defendant's unlawful conversations. This argument was 
rejected by the Court on the grounds that any restraint exercised by 
37. [d. at 3:49 (quoting Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966». 
The court of appeals relied on Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra. Essential to the decision in 
Silverman was that the police invaded a "constitutionally protected area." 
Because the public phone booth involved in Katz was not a "constitutionally 
protected area," the court of appeals concluded that petitioner's fourth 
amendment rights had not been violated. 
38. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that regardless of whether 
the police intrude on private premises, if they violate "the privacy upon which 
[the defendant] justifiably relied .... " 389 U.S. at 353, there is a search and 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The fact that the 
electronic device attached to the phone booth by the FBI did not penetrate the 
walls of the booth has no constitutional significance. This determination is a 
clear departure from Silverman, in which the Court relied exclusively on the 
fact that the "spike-mike" made contact with defendant's premises. The 
rejection of the trespass standard entirely overruled Goldman v. United States, 
316 U.S. 128 (1940). See note 15-18 and accompanying text supra. See also 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (property interests do not control 
the right of the government to search and seize); Note, Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping Under the Fourth Amendment - After Berger and Katz, 17 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 455 (1968). See generally Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy -
Katz v. United States, A Postscription, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976>. 
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967>. 
40. [d. at 354. The Government argued that the decision should not be tested by 
fourth amendment standards because the surveillance technique employed 
required no trespass onto petitioner's premises. In rejecting that contention the 
Court explained that "the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of 
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, 
overheard without any 'technical tresspass under ... local property laws.''' [d. 
at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505. 511 (1961)>' 
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the FBI was self-imposed. Refusing to depart from the strict 
requirements set out in Berger, the Court found that "searches 
conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment."41 
III. TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL 
AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 
In response to Katz and Berger, Congress enacted Title 111,42 
establishing a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of wiretap-
ping and electronic surveillance. Title III represents "an attempt by 
Congress to protect privacy of the individual while promoting a more 
effective control of crime."43 Although Title III generally proscribes 
the interception of oral and wire communications,44 it does provide 
for a highly particularized procedure whereby law enforcement 
agencies may obtain authorization to conduct wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance. Title III also provides that no evidence 
obtained in violation of its provisions may be received in evidence in 
any trial. 45 
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original). See also 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (the Constitution 
requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer be 
interposed between the citizen and the police). For a thorough discussion of 
Berger and Katz, see Note, Electronic Eavesdropping Under The Fourth 
Amendment - After Berger and Katz, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 455, 455-66 (1968). 
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). For a background discussion of Title III, see 
Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order - Title 
III, Consent, and The Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41, 52-66 
(1976). . 
43. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974). Accord, Gelbard v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 41, 46-48 (1972). 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying Title III under-
scores the congressional policy as follows: 
Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire 
and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the 
circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and 
oral communications may be authorized. To assure the privacy of oral 
and wire communications, title III prohibits all wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law 
enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or prevention of 
specified types of serious crimes, and only after authorization of a court 
order obtained after a showing and finding of probable cause. 
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968). 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970). This section provides that one who wilfully 
intercepts any wire or oral communication in violation of Title III shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970). That section provides: 
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part 
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived 
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the 
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The procedure mandated by Title III for obtaining authorization 
to conduct surveillance begins with an application by a law 
enforcement agent, authorized by the Attorney General,46 to a federal 
judge.47 Each application must contain a statement of facts which 
justifies the agent's belief that an order should be issued. This 
statement must include details of the particular offense the agent 
believes is being committed,48 the location at which the communica-
tions sought to be intercepted are taking place, the type of 
communications involved, and the identity of the person thought to 
be committing the offense. The application must also state whether 
other investigative procedures have been attempted, how long the 
agent believes the interception should be maintained,49 and whether 
any previous applications have been made to intercept communica-
tions either of the same person or emanating from the same place.50 
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure 
of that information would be in violation of this chapter. 
The purpose of § 2515, like the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment, is to 
deter privacy-invading misconduct by denying government officials the fruit of 
that misconduct. In re Proceedings to Enforce Guard Jury Subpoenas, 430 F. 
Supp. 1071, 1072-73 (E.D. Pa. 1977). It is clear, however, that § 2515 provides 
a protection independent of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in that it 
affords special safeguards against the unique problems posed by unauthorized 
electronic surveillance. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 n.11 
(1974). The Supreme Court has held that § 2515 can be invoked by a grand jury 
witness in defending a contempt charge for refusal to answer questions based 
on information obtained from the witness' communications alleged to have been 
obtained in violation of Title III. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). 
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). This section also provides that any Assistant 
Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General may authorize 
an application. This provision has been rigidly applied to invalidate an 
application authorized by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant. United 
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (proper remedy for invalid application 
is suppression of all evidence procured from wiretap even though there may 
have been no constitutional violation in obtaining the evidence). 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1} (1970). Although this subsection applies only to applications 
submitted to a federal court, § 2516(2} provides that the principle prosecuting 
attorney for any state, .if authorized by state statute, may apply to a state court 
judge for an order authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications. 
In State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a state must enact its own wiretap statute before a judge of 
that state can issue an order pursuant to Title III, and the state statute must be 
no less restrictive than its federal counterpart. Id. at 271, 292 A.2d at 94. See 
note 8 supra. 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b} (1970). A federal court may issue an order only if there is 
probable cause to believe that the interception will provide evidence concerning 
one of the offenses enumerated in § 2516(1)(a}-(g). In a state court, the 
interception of communications may only be authorized if there is probable 
cause for belief that particular communications concerning a crime enumerated 
in § 2516(2} will be obtained through such interception. 
49. No Title III order may authorize the interception of communications for any 
period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor 
in any event longer than thirty days. 18 U.s.C. § 2518(5) (1970). 
50. 18 U.s.C. § 2518(1)(c)-(e} (1970). 
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Upon compliance with the above requirements, the judge may enter 
an ex parte order authorizing the interception of communications if 
he determines that there is probable cause to believe a particular 
offense is being committed, that communications concerning the 
offense will be obtained, that normal investigative procedures are 
inadequate, and that the place where the communications are to be 
intercepted is being used in connection with the offense.51 Finally, 
Title III provides that any "aggrieved person" may move to suppress 
the contents of any unlawfully intercepted communication. 52 
IV. THE ENTRY DILEMMA 
Since the enactment of Title III more than half of the federal 
courts of appeals have confronted cases involving surreptitious 
entries by law enforcement officials for the purpose of installing 
eavesdropping devices.53 Two issues have arisen in these cases as a 
result of Title Ill's silence on the question of entries. The first is 
whether Title III empowers courts, upon issuing an order to intercept 
communications, to authorize an entry of the target premises in 
order to install eavesdropping devices. The second issue, assuming 
the first is answered in the affirmative, is whether law enforcement 
officials who obtain a valid Title III order have implicit authority to 
conduct entries without express approval from the issuing judge.54 
The conflicting results reached by the courts of appeals regarding 
these issues have turned on the courts' interpretations of congres-
sional intent in enacting Title III. Three different positions have 
been adopted by the circuits with respect to these entry issues. 
51. Id. at § 2518(3). 
52. Id. at § 2518(10)(a). An "aggrieved person" is one whose conversations have 
been intercepted. United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978). A person may move to suppress the fruits of a 
wiretap only if his privacy was actually invaded, that is, if he was a participant 
in intercepted conversations or if such conversations occurred on his premises. 
United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 
(1974). Congress was more specific in delineating the right of the United States 
to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress. Section 2518(10)(b) 
provides that the United States shall have the right to appeal an order granting 
a motion to suppress or the denial of an application for an order of approval. 
See, e.g., Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977). 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). Several methods of eavesdropping require a physical entry of 
the target premises to install, repair, and remove the monitoring devices which 
pick up and transmit the intercepted conversations. See notes 4-7 and 
accompanying text supra. 
54. For a complete discussion of the authority to enter private premises once a Title 
III order is obtained, see McNamara, supra note 9. The author concludes that 
Congress intended to permit courts to approve covert entries, and that police 
have implicit authority to enter private premises to install necessary eaves-
dropping devices upon obtaining a valid Title III order, regardless of whether 
the issuing judge grants specific approval of such entry. 
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At one extreme, the Sixth55 and Ninth56 Circuits have held that 
entries are never permissible under Title III. Under this view, 
therefore, it is immaterial if the judge who issues a Title III order 
also expressly authorizes an entry. The rationale supporting this 
position is that Congress' attempt to circumscribe carefully invasions 
of privacy through enactment of Title III precludes the possibility 
that Congress intended to legalize "break-ins."57 In light of Congress' 
meticulous treatment of the procedure by which Title III authoriza-
tion may be secured, the Ninth Circuit believed that the omission of 
a provision dealing with authorization of entries must have been 
purposeful, and that congressional silence could not be filled by 
implication. 58 
At the other extreme, the Second59 and Third60 Circuits have held 
not only that Congress intended to authorize entries, but also that 
once a law enforcement official obtains a valid Title III order he has 
implicit authority to enter the target premises to install eavesdrop-
ping devices. Under this view it is also irrelevant whether the 
issuing judge authorizes an entry. The rationale adopted by these 
courts is that any order authorizing electronic surveillance must, to 
be effective, carry its own authority to make such reasonable entries 
as are necessary to effectuate the order.6! Once a judicial officer has 
55. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978). 
56. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978). 
57. ld. at 457. The court noted that the majority of Title III's provisions are efforts 
to restrict the use of electronic surveillance to safeguard privacy. ld. at 458. 
Accord, United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978). In Finazzo the 
court held that: 
it simply does not make sense to imply Congressional authority for 
official break-ins when not a single line or word of the statute even 
mentions the possibility, much less limits or defines the scope of the 
power or describes the circumstances under which such conduct, 
normally unlawful, may take place. 
ld. at 841. 
58. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1978). 
Congress was certainly aware of the entry problem. The congressional 
debate on Title III reveals that the issue of bugging a private home was 
frequently discussed. See, e.g., 114 CONGo REC. 12989 (1968). The Senate Reports 
also indicate an awareness of the entry problems. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1968). 
59. United States V. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 
(1978). 
60. United States V. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), affd, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
Accord, United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Md. 1976) (the 
intrusion accompanying the entry is no greater than the interception itself, 
which is judicially authorized after a finding of probable cause), affd sub nom. 
United States V. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 
930 (1978). 
61. United States V. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 
903 (1978). The court further held that once the electronic equipment is 
installed, the police have implied authority to re-enter to repair or recharge the 
devices. It reasoned that subsequent entries to maintain equipment do not 
result in any greater invasion into the occupant's privacy than that resulting 
from the original entries. ld. at 640. 
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decided that the requisite probable cause exists,62 and a Title III 
order is issued, these circuits found that it is within the discretion of 
the law enforcement agency to determine the precise mechanical 
means necessary to effectuate the order.63 
Two circuits have adopted a middle ground. The Fourth Circuit64 
and the District of Columbia Circuit65 have taken the position that 
because Congress clearly desired to arm federal investigators with 
the power to conduct electronic surveillance, it could not have 
intended to forbid surreptitious entries which are vital to the 
effective exercise of that power.66 Therefore, in enacting Title III, 
Congress intended to empower judges to authorize entries.67 These 
two circuits also held, however, that permission to enter private 
premises cannot be implied from a Title III order sanctioning only 
the interception of oral communications.68 The rationale behind this 
position is that a secret trespass upon private premises to plant bugs 
entails an invasion of privacy of constitutional significance distinct 
from the interception of communications.69 In so holding, these 
circuits have applied a bifurcated analysis under which the eaves-
dropping and the entry are subjected to separate fourth amendment 
62. The probable cause determinations which must be established before a Title III 
order may be issued are enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970). See text 
accompanying note 51 supra. 
63. This rationale was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court. Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979). S!le notes 106-112 and accompanying text 
infra. 
64. Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977). 
65. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also United States v. 
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976) (courts issuing Title III orders have power 
to authorize entries, but the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether 
police have implied authority to enter without first apprising the judge of the 
planned entry), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). 
66. Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977). 
67. The Fourth Circuit found that "Congress implicitly commended the question of 
surreptitious entry to the informed discretion of the district judge." Application 
of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977). The court reasoned that if 
entries were prohibited, criminals could avoid apprehension by conducting their 
conversations upon premises which are insusceptible to eavesdropping by 
non-trespassory means. Such a tactic by criminals would not be difficult 
because the police cannot ordinarily bug a private home without entering it. As 
long as criminals avoid telephone conversations it would be difficult to 
intercept their conversations. The court in Application could "discern no 
congressional intent to open such a loophole in Title III." [d. at 643. 
68. [d. at 643-44; United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
69. Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977). The court in 
Application would countenance covert entries only when the issuing judge is 
apprised of the entry, finds that the device and the surreptitious entry incident 
to its installation provide the only effective means to conduct the investigation, 
and specifically sanctions such an entry in a manner which does not offend the 
fourth amendment. [d. at 644. 
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scrutiny.70 Therefore, even if a valid Title III order is obtained, any 
subsequent entry of the target premises is unconstitutional absent a 
particularized judicial authorization to enter.71 Any entry authorized, 
of course, must be reasonable. 72 
Despite the substantial constitutional questions presented by 
covert entries to install eavesdropping devices, the Supreme Court 
initially declined to address the validity of such entries. 73 Once the 
conflict developed among the circuits, however, the Court granted 
certiorari in Dalia v. United States. 74 
70. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In applying a 
bifurcated analysis, the court explained that the basic purpose of the fourth 
amendment is to safeguard the privacy of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by the government. Id. at 153. See Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Because a surreptitious entry is undoubtedly an invasion 
of privacy a prior warrant is required because that right is too precious to 
entrust to the police. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 
(1948). The holdings in Ford and Application that covert entry requires prior 
warrant, receive support from the language in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 
128 (1954). The Court in Irvine, upon expressing its concern over the effect of 
modern surveillance devices on individual privacy, made the following 
statement: 
That officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a 
device, even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of the 
occupants for over a month would be almost incredible if it were not 
admitted. Few police measures have come to our attention that more 
flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental 
principle declared by the Fourth Amendment. . . . 
Id. at 132. 
71. Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637,644 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
72. See id. In Ford the police obtained a Title III order to install bugs inside a shoe 
store which the police suspected was a locus for the distribution of narcotics. 
The judge was informed that the police intended to effect an entry into the store 
by means of a bomb-scare. The order authorized the police to enter and re-enter 
the premises to install eavesdropping equipment, and that such entries may be 
accomplished in any manner, including breaking and entering. Posing as a 
bomb squad the police evacuated and entered the store to install the bugs. 
When the devices failed to transmit, the police again conducted a bomb-scare 
ruse in order to re-enter the store. The court initially found that covert entries 
for the purpose of installing eavesdropping devices were subject to the warrant 
requirement of the fourth amendment. It then turned its attention to the 
sufficiency of the entry provision in that case. The court held that the provision 
was unconstitutional because it was over-broad in that it permitted the police 
to conduct multiple entries, at any time of day or night, and by any means they 
deemed necessary. 
73. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978); and United States v. Agrusa, 
541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977>. 
74. 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 439 U.S. 817 (1978), affd, 441 U.S. 
238 (1979). 
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V. DALIA u. UNITED STATES 
Testimony at the trial of Lawrence Dalia established that on 
March 14, 1973, Justice Department officials obtained authorization 
to intercept telephone conversations at his business office for a period 
of twenty days.75 The district court found probable cause to believe 
that Dalia was engaged in a conspiracy to steal goods being shipped 
in interstate commerce.76 On April 5th, the end of the twenty-day 
period, the Government was granted a twenty-day extension and 
additionally was authorized to intercept all oral communications, 
including those not involving the telephone. 77 Although the exten-
sion order did not explicitly authorize the FBI to enter Dalia's 
business premises, agents assigned to implement the order secretly 
entered the office at midnight on April 5th and spent several hours 
installing an electronic bug in the ceiling.78 Dalia was subsequently 
indicted for conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric. The 
Government introduced into evidence conversations of defendant 
that had been intercepted pursuant to the March 14th wiretap order 
and the April 5th bugging order. 79 The unmistakable inference to be 
drawn from the conversations was that Dalia was an active 
participant in a scheme to steal a truckload of fabric. 8u 
Prior to trial, Dalia moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
through the bugging device on the grounds that the FBI had not 
received judicial approval to enter his office. The trial court denied 
the motion, ruling that under Title III a surreptitious entry to install 
eavesdropping devices is not unlawful merely because the court 
approving the surveillance did not expressly authorize the entry. The 
75. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 241 0979>. 
76. Id. See 18 U.S.C. ~ 2518(3) <1970>; text accompanying note 51 supra. 
77. Because the first intercept order authorized only the interception of wire 
communications (telephone conversations) and the extension authorized the 
interception of wire and oral communications, it is reasonable to assume that 
the issuing judge was aware that the FBI intended to bug Dalia's business 
premises and that an entry may be required. Indeed, the district court 
specifically noted that its order had implicitly authorized secret entry. Dalia v. 
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 n.21 (1979>. See 18 U.S.C. * 2510(1)-(2) <1970> 
(defining "wire communication" and "oral communication"). 
78. The fact that the FBI entered Dalia's office rather than his home is of no 
constitutional significance. That business premises as well as private resi-
dences are protected by the fourth amendment is beyond question. See. e.g .. 
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977); See v. City of Seat tie. 
387 U.S. 541 (1967>. 
79. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 245 (1979). 
80. Id. at 244-45. Intercepted telephone conversations revealed that Dalia had 
arranged for the storage of a truckload of fabric worth $250.000 that had been 
stolen and transported in interstate commerce. Intercepted communications 
resulting from the bugging showed that Dalia discussed with participants in 
the robbery how to proceed after other members of the alleged conspiracy had 
been arrested. 
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trial court's view was that "implicit in the court's order [authorizing 
electronic surveillance] is concomitant authorization for agents to 
covertly enter the premises in question and install the necessary 
equipment."SJ The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that 
when law enforcement agents obtain Title III authorization to bug 
private premises a separate order authorizing an entry is not 
required.s2 In a five-to-four decision the Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that Congress, in enacting Title III, intended to empower 
courts to authorize secret entries onto private premises for purposes 
of installing eavesdropping devices.s3 The Court further held that law 
enforcement officers who obtain Title III authorization to conduct 
electronic surveillance have implicit authority to enter the target 
premises surreptitiously to install the necessary devices. 
VI. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The defendant Dalia made three contentions on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. He argued that covert entry of private premises was 
unconstitutional in all cases, that Congress did not give the courts 
statutory authority to approve covert entries even if constitutionally 
it could have done so, and that even if Congress did intend to permit 
secret entries, the authorizing court must expressly approve of such 
entries before they are accomplished. 
A. The Constitutionality of Entries 
In response to Dalia's argument that the fourth amendment 
prohibits all covert entries of private premises, the Court noted that 
in several prior cases it had intimated that in certain circumstances 
covert entry to install eavesdropping devices would be constitutional 
81. United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 866 m.N.J. 1977), affd, 575 F.2d 1344 
(3d Cir. 1978), affd, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). The district court specifically 
declined to adopt the reasoning or holding of United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 
146 m.c. Cir. 1977). See discussion at notes 64-72 and accompanying text 
supra. 
82. United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), affd, 441 U.S. 238 (1979>. 
Accord, United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 
U.S. 903 (1978), Contra, United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 m.c. Cir. 1977); 
Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977>. But cf United States 
v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978) (judges have no power under Title III to 
authorize covert entries); United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(same). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 55-72 and accompanying text 
supra. See generally McNamara, supra note 9. 
83. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979>. 
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if conducted pursuant to a search warrant.84 Additionally, the Court 
observed that it is well established that law enforcement officers may 
break and enter private premises to execute a search warrant when 
such entry is necessary to execute the warrant effectively.85 The 
fourth amendment, therefore, "does not prohibit per se a covert entry 
performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic 
bugging equipment."86 
B. Congressional Intent to Authorize Entries 
The defendant Dalia's second contention was that Congress did 
not empower courts issuing a Title III order to approve surreptitious 
entries.87 Recognizing that Title III is silent on the question of 
entries, the majority nevertheless found that: 
[t]he language, structure, and history of the statute, however, 
demonstrate that Congress meant to authorize courts -
in certain specified circumstances - to approve electronic 
surveillance without limitation on the means necessary to 
its accomplishment so long as they are reasonable under the 
circumstances.88 
84. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (conducting electronic 
surveillance without a search warrant or other process violates fourth 
amendment); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (federal agents 
may not enter private premises to eavesdrop without a warrant); Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (the fourth amendment does not make the home or 
office sanctuaries where the law can never reach, but it is not asking too much 
to require police to obtain a warrant before the innermost secrets of one's home 
or office are invaded). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 864 (1973). Cf. Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(forcible entry into unoccupied premises pursuant to search warrant does not 
violate fourth amendment). 
In regard to the necessity of the FBI entry in Dalia, the Supreme Court 
gave deference to the district court's finding that normal investigative 
procedures were unlikely to succeed in obtaining evidence of the conspiracy, 
that the bugging was therefore necessary, and that the safest method of 
installing the device was through breaking and entering. Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 n.8 (1979). 
86. [d. at 248 (emphasis in original). The dissenters agreed that the fourth 
amendment does not prohibit covert entry in all cases, but argued that in the 
absence of legislative or judicial sanction, the FBI entries in the instant case 
were "unreasonable" and therefore violative of the fourth amendment. [d. at 
262 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the fourth amendment requires prior judicial approval for 
electronic surveillance in domestic security cases). 
87. Accord, United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978). See notes 55-58 and accompanying text 
supra. 
88. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 249 (1979). 
1980] Dalia v. United States 325 
The Court reasoned that the detailed restrictions contained in Title 
III were sufficient to guarantee that eavesdropping will occur only 
when there is a genuine need for it, and that once these restrictions 
are satisfied the courts have broad power to authorize interceptions 
of both wire and oral communications.89 Further, the majority found 
no indication in Title III that Congress intended that courts be 
limited to approving only those eavesdropping methods which do not 
require secret entries for installation.90 
Examining the history of Title III, the Dalia majority was 
convinced that Congress intended to empower courts to authorize 
entries.91 The majority believed that congressional silence was 
understandable because Congress did not perceive surveillance 
methods that require entry to differ from methods that do not. 
Moreover, testimony before subcommittees considering Title III 
indicated that surreptitious entries were necessary to accomplish 
89. Id. at 250. Although Title III ensures that eavesdropping will be utilized only 
when necessary, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970), there is nothing in its 
provisions to guarantee that covert entries will be executed only when needed. 
90. The dissent approached the question of whether entries could be· authorized 
from a different perspective. Instead of examining Title III to see if it imposed a 
limitation on secret entries, Justice Stevens looked to the statute to see 
whether it authorized such entries at all. In his view, no deference should be 
given to intrusions on privacy that are not expressly authorized by Congress. 
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 264 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
91. The majority noted that the Senate Reports on Title III contained repeated 
reference to the type of surveillance involved in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967), where police entered private premises to install a bugging device. 
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1968). The Court opined 
that committee members, as well as the full Senate, must not have found a 
significant difference between the type of surveillance used in Berger and the 
type employed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where a bugging 
device was attached to a public telephone booth. The Court also found that 
members of Congress who referred to covert entries thought that such entries 
would necessarily be a part of the surveillance authorized by Title III. To 
illustrate, the Court cited a remark made by Senator Tydings that "[b]ugs are 
difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. 
Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust the equipment." Dalia v. 
United States, 441 U.s. 238, 252 (1979) (quoting 114 CONGo REC. 12989 (1968)). 
Based on these and similar remarks the majority concluded that Congress, by 
authorizing the interception of oral communications as well as wire communi-
cations, necessarily intended to authorize surreptitious entries. 
The dissent, however, had a different interpretation of the congressional 
remarks. Justice Stevens noted that one senator who referred to Berger was an 
opponent of Title III who believed that the secret entry in that case had been 
ruled illegal. United States v. Dalia, 441 U.S. 238, 272 (1979) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). See 114 CONGo REC. 14708 (1968). Justice Stevens also found the 
remarks of Senator Tydings, quoted above, to be inconsistent with a congres-
sional intent to authorize break-ins and that Senator Tydings only meant that 
secret entries are often impossible because police may not be able to enter 
without violating the law. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. at 273 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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most electronic bugging operations.92 Because Congress was aware of 
the necessity of entry, the majority would not assume that the 
legislature nevertheless intended to restrict the scope of Title III to 
surveillance methods which do not require covert entry.93 
Finally, the Dalia Court explained that Congress' purpose in 
enacting Title III would be thwarted were the courts to read a 
limitation prohibiting covert entries into the statute.94 The Court 
reasoned that Title III permitted wiretapping and bugging because 
Congress concluded that both forms of surveillance were necessary to 
combat successfully certain forms of crime. Because electronic 
bugging is virtually impossible absent covert entry, the Court 
refused to deny the "respect for the policy of Congress [that] must 
save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous 
purpose."95 
It was on this issue of congressional intent that Justice Stevens, 
in his dissenting opinion, launched an attack on the majority 
92. Id. at 251. See, e.g., Anti-Crime Program, Hearings on H.R. 5037 Before 
Subcomm. No.5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1031 (1967). The Court assumed from this that the entire Congress was aware 
that most bugging operations require covert entry. See also United States v. 
Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 882 m.D.C. 1976), affd, 553 F.2d 146 m.c. Cir. 1977); 
McNamara, supra note 9, at 3. Justice Stevens, dissenting, acknowledged that 
in some circumstances the installation of a bugging device may not be possible 
without forcible breaking and entering, but this is not convincing evidence that 
Congress intended to authorize entries. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.s. 238, 
267 n.13 (1979). 
93. Id. at 252. The Court found support for this conclusion in 18 U.S.C. * 2518(4)(e) 
(1970), which provides that: 
An. order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communica-
tion shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a communication 
common carrier, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the 
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance 
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a 
minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, 
custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are 
to be intercepted. 
The majority viewed this provision as evidence that Congress anticipated that 
landlords and custodians would be called upon to aid law enforcement officers 
to covertly enter private premises to install eavesdropping equipment. Dalia v. 
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n.10 (1979). The dissent, however, interpreted 
this provision as yet another example that Congress intended to withhold 
authority to trespass on private property. Focusing on the word "unobtrusive-
ly," Justice Stevens concluded that Congress could not have intended to 
condone unlimited and unauthorized breaking and entering by police with the 
aid of nothing but burglar'S tools. Id. at 271 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting!. 
94. The Senate Report on Title III unequivocally states that "Itlhe major purpose of 
Title III is to combat organized crime." S. REI'. No. 1097. 90th Cong .. 2d Sess. 75 
(1968l. 
95. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 254 (1979) (quoting Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). Accord. Application of United States. 563 
F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 1977) (a finding that Congress did not intend to permit 
covert entries would run counter to the principle that courts should attempt to 
effectuate the purpose of federal legislation and avoid interpretations which 
produce absurd results). 
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opinion.96 While acknowledging that Title III is silent on the entry 
issue, he vigorously asserted that the power to authorize entries 
should not be read into a statute that does not expressly grant it. 
Justice Stevens reasoned that the Court's duty to protect individual 
rights takes precedence over the interest in more effective law 
enforcement.97 He also argued that the structural detail of Title III 
precludes a reading that converts silence into executive power98 and 
that Congress never contemplated that it was authorizing the type of 
surveillance employed in Dalia.99 
C. Implied Entries 
Dalia's final contention before the Court was that even if 
Congress empowered courts to authorize secret entries, the authoriz-
ing court must explicitly approve such entries before they are 
accomplished. 10o He argued that because the Title III order in his case 
96. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall 
joined, was devoted to the question of legislative intent. Although he did not 
reach the issue of whether authority to enter could be implied from a Title III 
order, Justice Stevens did state that he would not uphold a covert entry unless 
Congress clearly authorized the courts to approve of such entries. Justice 
Brennan, joined in part by Justice Stewart, filed a separate dissenting opinion 
in which he attacked the majority's holding that authority to enter private 
premises surreptitiously could be implied from a Title III order. 
97. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 263 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens recognized that it is appropriate to accord deference to Congress 
when it has balanced the need for a new investigative technique against the 
unfavorable consequences of intrusions on privacy rights. He was unwilling, 
however, to give comparable deference to invasions of privacy that are not 
expressly authorized by Congress. Id. at 264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 266-70. The dissent pointed out that the majority's holding that Title III 
implicitly authorized covert entries was especially anomalous because the 
statutory scheme in all other respects is exhaustive and explicit. It is not 
sensible to conclude that Congress, having minutely detailed the entire 
procedure to be followed for obtaining authorization to intercept communica-
tions, see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 
(1972); 18 U.S.C. ~ 2518 (1970), intended to give police unbounded authority to 
carry out Title III orders in any unspecified and obstrusive manner they choose. 
Id. at 267-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99. Justice Stevens noted that the opponents of Title III, while informing Congress 
of the invasions of privacy which would accompany the enactment of Title III, 
never mentioned the breaking and entering of private premises. See e.g .• 114 
CONGo REC 14711 (1968). That the opponents complained of far less aggravated 
invasions of privacy without mentioning entries was evidence that they never 
contemplated that they were authorizing covert entries. And because the 
supporters of Title III stated that they had specified "every possible constitu-
tional safeguard for the rights of individual privacy." Dalia V. United States, 
441 U.S. 238,274 (1979) (Stevens, J., disseriting) (quoting 114 Cow;. REC. 14469 
(1968», there is no indication that they considered the issue of covert entries 
either. Justice Stevens further opined that had Congress contemplated the 
issue it would not have granted the executive branch the authority to break 
and enter private premises. Id. at 274 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting>. 
100. Accord, Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977); United 
States V. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 m.c. Cir. 1977>. 
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did not expressly authorize the FBI to enter his office, that entry 
violated his privacy rights under the fourth amendment. lol In 
rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out that there are only 
three requirements for a valid search warrant: the warrant must be 
issued by a disinterested magistrate,102 there must be probable cause 
to believe that the evidence sought will aid in the apprehension or 
conviction of one suspected of committing a particular offense,103 and 
the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and 
the things to be seized. l04 Finding that these requirements had been 
satisfied, the majority concluded that the April 5th order authorizing 
the interception of oral communications emanating from Dalia's 
office was issued in full compliance with the fourth amendment. l05 
In answer to Dalia's contention that the April 5th order was 
insufficient because it failed to specify that it could be executed by 
covert entry, the majority found nothing in the Constitution 
requiring a search warrant to state the precise manner in which it is 
to be executed. lOG The majority noted that the police have discretion 
in determining the details of how best to execute a warrant and may 
resort to forcible breaking and entering if necessary to effectuate a 
search warrant. 107 Dalia argued that the entry into his office was a 
101. The majority noted that Title III does not require that express authorization for 
covert entries be set forth in the issuing court's order to intercept communica-
tions. Therefore, if there is a requirement of express judicial authorization for 
secret entry it must come from the fourth amendment alone. Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.s. 238, 255 n.17 (1979). 
102. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977). 
103. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967>. 
104. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). 
105. The Court broadly stated that "[blecause of the strict requirements of Title III 
all of the indicia of a warrant necessarily are present whenever an order under 
Title III is issued." Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 n.18 (1979). 
106. [d. at 256. Justice Brennan vigorously objected to the majority's assertion that 
covert entries to install eavesdropping devices are a mere mode of warrant 
execution. [d. at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord, Application of United 
States, 563 F.2d 634, 643 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.s. 505 (1961). But cf McNamara, supra note 9, at 9 (without flexibility in 
the time, place, manner, and method of entry, police would be hamstrung in 
their efforts to successfully execute an order to intercept communications). 
107. In support of this rationale the Court cited United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 
40 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). In Gervato the police 
obtained a warrant to search petitioner's apartment. Upon arriving at the 
apartment, and aware that petitioner was not home, the police forcibly opened 
the door to execute the warrant. The Third Circuit held that the fourth 
amendment does not require that the suspect be present before his home can be 
searched under a valid warrant. Therefore, the search was "reasonable" and the 
fruits thereof were properly admitted at trial. The majority in Dalia buttressed 
this argument by noting that officers requesting a warrant are not constitution-
ally required to set forth the anticipated means of executing that warrant. 
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 n.19 (1979). 
Justice Brennan thought that the majority's reliance on Gervato was 
misplaced because in that case police could not have anticipated, at the time 
the warrant was issued, that it would be necessary to forcibly enter petitioner's 
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distinct infringement of his privacy rights because it went beyond 
the interception of communications authorized by the Title III order 
by subjecting his personal papers and effects to unauthorized 
examination. !Os The Court found that this view of the warrant clause 
"parses too finely the· interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment,"I09 and that it would push the warrant clause to the extreme if 
courts were required to specify the precise procedures to be followed 
in executing a warrant whenever it is likely that fourth amendment 
rights may be affected in more than one way.110 The majority 
reasoned that it would promote "empty formalism" if the Court were 
to require judges to make explicit what is unquestionably implicit in 
a bugging authorization - that a covert entry may be needed for the 
installation of electronic surveillance equipment. ll1 It therefore 
home. Moreover, Gervato involved a mere mode of warrant execution whereas 
Dalia involved an invasion of two separate expectations of privacy. Id. at 261 
<Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the problems of anticipating when 
covert entries will be necessary, see Note, Covert Entry In Electronic 
Surveillance: The Fourth Amendment Requirements, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 203 
(1978), 
108. Dalia was urging the Court to adopt the holding and rationale of United States 
v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 152-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See notes 64-72 and 
accompanying text supra. 
109. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979). 
110. Id. at 258. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, reasoned that police 
executing a warrant often find it necessary to interfere with privacy rights not 
explicitly considered by the magistrate who issued the warrant. For example, 
the Court referred to the common situation where police executing an arrest 
warrant find it necessary to enter the suspect's home to take him into custody, 
and thereby impinge on both privacy and freedom of movement. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976). 
Justice Brennan, dissenting, thought the Court's reliance on Cravero was 
misplaced. In Cravero, the police could not have anticipated when the arrest 
warrant to specify a home arrest. In contrast, the entry into Dalia's office 
order to arrest him. Therefore, it would have been unreasonable to require the 
warrant to specify a home arrest. In contrast, the entry into petitioner's office 
was easily foreseeable, and the FBI could have informed the magistrate who 
issued the Title III order that it contemplated covert entry. Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1979) <Brennan, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 258. The majority noted that the district court specifically stated that its 
order had implicitly authorized covert entry. Id. at 258 n.21. C{. United States 
v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 842-45 (6th Cir. 1978) (judge issuing Title III order 
was aware that secret, forcible entry would be necessary to install equipment, 
but had no power to authorize such entry). 
The Court further justified its conclusion by noting that the manner in 
which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial scrutiny as to its 
reasonableness. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.s. 238, 258 (1979), See Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.s. 547, 559-60 (1978). The majority then noted that the 
covert entries into Dalia's office were reasonable. The FBI had entered only 
twice - once to install the eavesdropping equipment and once to remove it. 
There was no evidence that the FBI intrusion went beyond what was necessary 
to accomplish the surveillance. C{. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (entries for the placement repair, and removal of bugs are not invalid 
provided the police adhere to the sole authorized purpose of seizing conversa-
tions), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978). 
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concluded that the fourth amendment does not require a Title III 
order to contain specific authorization to enter the premises de-
scribed in the order. The Court did note, however, that the preferable 
approach would be for law enforcement agents to obtain express 
permission for an entry from the judge who authorizes the surveil-
lance. 112 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated that obtaining explicit 
authorization to enter covertly is not only preferable, but also 
constitutionally required. 1I3 In his opinion, the breaking and entering 
of private premises for the purpose of installing eavesdropping 
devices cannot be characterized as a mere mode of executing a 
warrant to be left to the discretion of the police. Agreeing with 
several of the circuits,1I4 Justice Brennan found that covert entries 
entail an invasion of privacy of constitutional significance distinct 
from that which attends the mere interception of oral communica-
tions.1I5 Because such entries breach physical as well as conversa-
tional privacy, a warrant that describes only the seizure of conversa-
tions cannot be read expansively to authorize physical invasions of 
privacy at the discretion of the police.1I6 Justice Brennan concluded 
112. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 259 n.22 (1979). It was also noted that the 
Department of Justice adopted a policy to include in Title III applications a 
request that the judge explicitly authorize surreptitious entry for the purpose of 
installing and removing electronic eavesdropping devices. [d.; see Brief for 
Appellee at 56, Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
113. [d. at 259 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan adamantly objected to the 
majority's rationale that requiring a warrant to enter in a bugging case would 
"promote empty formalism." In his opinion, adherence to the strictures of the 
warrant and particularity clauses of the fourth amendment would never 
constitute "empty formalism." Moreover, Justice Brennan was not convinced 
that private premises could not be bugged without the need for surreptitious 
entry. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 467-68 (1963) <Brennan, J., 
dissenting). Because covert entries are not always needed, requiring the police 
to secure prior approval to conduct such entries may prevent unnecessary and 
improper intrusions. 
114. See, e.g., Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977). 
115. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1979) <Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Because surreptitious entries amount to an additional intrusion, Justice 
Brennan concluded that such entries are "tantamount to an independent search 
and seizure." [d. at 260. 
116. Justice Brennan did not suggest that courts must authorize every movement of 
the police in executing a warrant. He recognized that police may be forced to 
adjust their plans if they encounter changed circumstances. The details of how 
best to proceed with a covert entry could be left to the discretion of the police. 
However, the warrant must at least state that covert entry will be utilized in 
accomplishing the interception of communications. [d. at 261. 
Justice Brennan also pointed out that the fourth amendment limits an 
officer executing a search warrant within the bounds set by the warrant, 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.s. 388, 394 n.7 (1971), 
in order to ensure that those searches remain as limited as possible. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). This limitation is necessary because 
the Constitution demands that the necessity for invasion of private premises be 
decided by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 
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that, because of these additional instrusions, the Constitution 
requires that law enforcement agents who wish to break and enter 
private premises first secure explicit judicial approval. Therefore, 
Justice Brennan would hold that authority for the entry cannot be 
derived from a Title III order authorizing only electronic surveil-
lance. 
VII. EVALUATION OF DALIA 
A. The Constitutionality of Surreptitious Entries 
There was no dissent from the holding in Dalia that the fourth 
amendment does not per se prohibit covert entries.1I7 This holding is 
a logical extension of prior decisions in which the Court intimated 
that secret entries to install eavesdropping devices would be 
constitutionally acceptable in certain circumstances. For example, in 
Silverman v. United States,IIS the Court stated that "[t]his Court has 
never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without 
consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there 
secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent 
criminal trial what was seen or heard."119 Implicit in Silverman is the 
view that surreptitious entries could be constitutional if made 
pursuant to a search warrant. Moreover, in Berger v. New York,120 
the Court specifically stated that "[w]hile '[t]he requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or unobtusely unyielding to 
the legitimate needs of law enforcement,' it is not asking too much 
that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the 
Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's home or 
office are invaded."121 The decision in Dalia is consistent with these 
cases only to the extent that the Court limited the constitutionality 
of covert entries to those conducted pursuant to a valid Title III 
order. In reaching this conclusion, the Court struck a delicate 
balance between providing sufficient protection of individual privacy 
and making available to law enforcement agencies a valuable 
investigative technique. 
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
117. The dissenters agreed that a covert entry would not violate the fourth 
amendment if Congress expressly authorized courts to approve entries and if a 
court explicitly approved that particular entry. See note 86 supra. 
118. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra. 
119. [d. at 511-12 (emphasis added). See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 
(1954) (covert entry to install eavesdropping devices without a search warrant 
is violative of the fourth amendment). 
120. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra. 
121. [d. at 63 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1933) <Brennan, J., 
dissenting». See also T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
114 (1969), where the author concludes that the constitutional validity of covert 
entries to install bugs is a natural consequence of the reasoning in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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B. Legislative Intent to Authorize Entries 
The Court's holding that Congress intended to empower courts 
to authorize covert entries receives· substantial support from the 
express language of Title III and its legislative history. One 
convincing provision of Title III reflecting that intention is section 
2516. 122 That provision authorizes the interception of both oral and 
wire communications. 123 Because Congress specifically provided for 
the use of both forms of surveillance it is obvious that Congress was 
fully aware of the distinction between wiretapping and bugging, 124 
and nevertheless chose to deal with them in the same manner.125 
Inasmuch as Congress was aware that it was authorizing bugging and 
understood that bugging could rarely be accomplished without secret 
entry,t26 it follows that Congress realized that by enacting Title III it 
was authorizing covert entries. 127 
Another provision which indicates that Congress intended to 
authorize entries is section 2518(4).128 That subsection provides that 
a court issuing a Title III order shall direct that a communications 
common carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person furnish the 
applicant with information, facilities, and technical assistance 
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively.129 Because 
the aid of landlords and custodians is only required if a covert entry 
is necessary, Congress must have anticipated that law enforcement 
agents would have to enter private premises covertly to install 
equipment. 13o Finally, Congress mandated that both the application 
and the Title III order describe with particularity the "facilities from 
which or the place where"131 the communications are to be inter-
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970). 
123. [d. at § 2516(1). 
124. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1968). For a discussion of the 
distinction between wiretapping and bugging, see LAPIDUS, supra note 6. See 
also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1967); notes 6-7 supra. 
125. Title III mandates the identical procedure for the interception of both wire and 
oral communications. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 249 (1979), 
126. See note 92 supra. 
127. Accord, Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 
(1978). Contra, United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1978). 
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970) (quoted at note 93 supra) (construed in United States 
v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 851 (1978) (concurring opinion». 
129. See generally United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.s. 159 (977) (if 
authorized by statute, courts may compel a telephone company to render 
assistance if that company's facilities are being used to facilitate a criminal 
enterprise). 
130. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n.10 (1979), Accord, United States v. 
Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 883 m.D.C. 1976), affd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (1970) (emphasis added). See also id. at § 2518(4)(b); 
McNamara, supra note 9, at 9. 
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cepted. It is reasonable to infer that Congress, in requIrmg a 
description of the "place where" the communications are to be 
intercepted, contemplated that some sort of entry into that place 
would be required if the surveillance were to be effective. 
The legislative history of Title III also reveals that Congress 
intended to authorize covert entries. The congressional debate on 
Title III shows that the issue of bugging private premises was 
frequently discussed with the understanding, sometimes express, 
that entries would be required to install eavesdropping devices. For 
example, Senator Tydings explained that "[b]ugs are difficult to 
install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. 
Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment."132 
Another Senator commented that "I know that elaborate efforts are 
made to distinguish between a real wiretap, or bug, which requires 
someone to intrude upon private premises to install. That kind of 
invasion is truly a search, requiring a warrant."133 Moreover, a 
Senate Report noted that "[a]ll orders and extensions must be 
executed as soon as practicable. A wiretap can take up to several 
days to install. Other forms or devices may take even longer."134 The 
Senate Reports on Title III also reveal that repeated reference was 
made to the covert entry involved in Berger v. New Y ork. 135 In Berger 
the Court spelled out the provisions that must be contained in a 
constitutional eavesdropping statute.136 The Court did not mandate, 
however, that a provision authorizing covert entry be included. That 
it failed to require an entry provision is persuasive evidence that no 
such provision is needed. Arguably, the reason that Congress did not 
include an entry provision was because a reading of Berger indicated 
that it was unnecessary.137 Aware of Congress' conscious attempt to 
conform Title III to the mandates of Berger, the majority in Dalia 
properly concluded that the explanation of Congress' failure to 
address explicitly the question of covert entries was that it did not 
perceive surveillance requiring such entries to differ in any signifi-
cant way from the covert tapping of a telephone. 
132. 114 CONGo REC. 12989 (968). 
133. 114 CONGo REC. 11598 (968) (remarks of Sen. Morse). But cf United States V. 
Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (refused to read Senator Morse's 
comment as indicating that he understood that entries would be authorized). 
134. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1968) (emphasis added). For a 
discussion of the problems involved in installing and maintaining electronic 
surveillance equipment, see National Wiretap Commission Report, Electronic 
Surveillance 86 0976>. 
135. 388 U.S. 41 0967>. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75, 
101-02 <1968>. 
136. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra. 
137. See Dalia V. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 251 n.12 <1979>. 
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C. Entries Without Prior Judicial Approval 
The Court's conclusion in Dalia that the mere issuance of a Title 
III order gives law enforcement agents implied authority to enter 
private premises surreptitiously condones a serious invasion of 
privacy that was not explicitly authorized by statute. In finding that 
all of the requirements of a valid warrant to enter are present in a 
Title III order/3s the majority failed to pay deference to the 
established principle that the fourth amendment confines an officer 
executing a warrant within the express bounds set by the warrant. 139 
While a Title III order may constitute a valid warrant to seize 
communications, that warrant should not be read expansively to 
authorize a constitutionally distinct invasion of privacy at the 
discretion of the executing officer because the Constitution requires 
that the necessity for invading one's privacy be decided "by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."14o 
Despite the majority's finding that the issuing judge found probable 
cause to believe that the evidence sought would aid in Dalia's 
conviction,141 there was no judicial determination of probable cause 
that an entry was needed. The Court's holding is a departure from 
prior decisions holding that a separate determination of probable 
cause and reasonableness is required for each intrusion on private 
premises. 142 Until Dalia, the majority of the courts of appeals had 
assumed that unless a judicially created exception to the warrant 
clause could be invoked, when a case involves incursions on both 
private premises and conversational privacy each intrusion requires 
separate judicial authorization. 143 The warrant clause was included 
in the fourth amendment so that an objective mind might weigh the 
need to invade individual privacy in order to enforce the law,144 and 
entry of private premises is the traditional focus of the warrant 
138. Id. at 256 n.18. 
139. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 
n.7 (1971); Marron v. United States, 275 U.s. 192, 196 (1927). 
140. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.s. 238, 261 (1979) (Brennan. J .. dissenting) 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948»). 
141. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 (1979). See also 18 U.S.C. 
* 2518(3) <1970>. 
142. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969) (police who lawfully 
interfere with one aspect of an individual's privacy have no right to conduct 
further intrusions in the absence of a warrant>. See also Berger v. New York. 
388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); Osborn v. United States. 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
143. See, e.g., United States v. Ford. 553 F.2d 146, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1977>. See generallv 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 21 (19681 (in justifying a particular intrusion th'e 
police must be able to point to facts which reasonably warrant that intrusion I. 
144. McDonald v. United States. 335 U.S. 451. 4f)f) 119481. 
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requirement. 145 By excluding the judiciary from the determination of 
whether covert entries are needed and allowing agents to enter when 
the issuing judge is not even apprised of the entry,t46 the Court is 
subjecting an individual's right to privacy to invasion at the 
discretion of the polic~. 
The Dalia majority's rationale that covert entries are a mere 
form of warrant execution, and that the police have discretion in 
determining such "details,"147 disregards the purpose of allowing 
police any discretion in executing a warrant. While some leeway 
must be granted to police so that they may conform their conduct to 
unforeseen situations which may arise during a warrant execution, 
there is no need to give police that discretion when they plan in 
advance to intrude on privacy interests not specifically authorized in 
the warrant. The majority's reliance on prior decisions upholding 
police conduct that interfered with privacy rights not explicitly 
considered in the warrant offers no support for the Dalia Court's 
holding. 148 In those cases the police did not encounter the need for 
additional intrusion until they were in the midst of executing a 
warrant, while in Dalia the FBI planned to break and enter the 
defendant's office at the time it received authorization to intercept 
communications. Although it may be reasonable to enter a suspect's 
home when necessary to effectuate an arrest warrant, a situation not 
anticipated at the time the warrant is issued, it is unreasonable for 
police to plan a breaking and entering of private premises and fail to 
apprise the judge of that intended scheme. Addressing the majority's 
assertion that covert entries are a mere form of warrant execution, 
Justice Brennan convincingly refuted the majority's strained reason-
ing. He argued that covert entry breaches physical as well as 
145. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 163 m.c. Cir. 1977). See also United States 
v. United States District Court, 335 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
146. See Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 644 (4th Cir. 1977) (require-
ment that judge be apprised of entries comports with the scheme of Title III of 
meticulous judicial supervision of all aspects of electronic surveillance). 
147. The majority reasoned that ''[ilt would extend the Warrant Clause to the 
extreme to require that, whenever it is reasonably likely that Fourth 
Amendment rights may be affected in more than one way, the court must set 
forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the executing officers." Dalia v. 
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979). The Court failed to consider, however, 
that the additional intrusions posed by covert entry are not only reasonably 
likely to occur but are inevitable. An entry is not merely a tangential invasion 
to the interception of communications, but rather an invasion of privacy of 
constitutional significance. [d. at 259-60 <Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, as 
pointed out by Justice Brennan, there is a middle ground between setting 
precise guidelines for the police in executing a warrant and failing to set any 
guidelines at all. 
148. The majority relied on United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), 
and United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 
864 (1973)' See notes 107 & 110 supra. 
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conversational privacy. A citizen's home or office, that "inviolate 
place which is a man's castle," is being invaded. 149 
The majority rejected too quickly Dalia's contention that a 
bifurcated analysis is required - that the interception of communi-
cations and the covert entry should be subjected to separate fourth 
amendment scrutiny. This analysis, which is based on the assump-
tion that secret entries intrude on privacy interests beyond the mere 
interception of conversations and thus constitute a separate invasion 
of privacy, had been applied by several of the circuits. In United 
States v. Ford,150 the District of Columbia Circuit found that 
surreptitious entries involve an invasion of privacy distinct from that 
entailed in the interception of oral communications. The court noted 
that bugging, unlike wiretapping, involves two separate aspects of 
the fourth amendment: "protection of private premises and of 
conversational privacy from unwarranted intrusion."151 It reasoned 
that a person whose physical privacy is to be invaded has the right to 
expect that a judicial officer will be apprised of a planned entry and 
will authorize only those entries necessary to satisfy the cognizable 
needs of law enforcement. Because covert entries to install bugs are 
distinct invasions of privacy, the court concluded that they require 
separate consideration in the warrant procedure. Similarly, in 
Application of United States/52 the court held that a Title III order 
authorizing the interception of conversations does not suspend the 
operation of the fourth amendment for other purposes. A Title III 
order cannot, in itself, justify additional governmental incursions 
into other aspects of private life. In determining whether a Title III 
application should be approved, any request to enter private 
premises must therefore be subjected to separate fourth amendment 
consideration. The only explanation offered by the Dalia majority for 
declining to apply this analysis was that it "parses too finely the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."153 The Court's failure 
to consider this point fully is puzzling, especially in light of the 
dissent's strong language that covert entries are "tantamount to an 
independent search and seizure."154 
149. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 260 (979) <Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 n.4 (961». 
150. 553 F.2d 146 m.c. Cir. 1977>. 
15l. [d. at 160. Accord, United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(surreptitious entries to install eavesdropping devices and the subsequent 
interception of conversations constitute a search and seizure composed of two 
distinct aspects, each entitled to protection under the fourth amendment), cert. 
denied. 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). 
152. 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977), 
153. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979), 
154. [d. at 260 <Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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The majority's refusal to apply a bifurcated analysis to the 
unauthorized entry of defendant's premises brings into focus a 
related issue that divided the Court. While the dissent vigorously 
argued that physical entries infringe privacy rights not otherwise 
invaded by the interception of spoken words, the majority failed to 
confront that issue. Curiously, the majority merely noted that there 
was no indication that the FBI went beyond what was necessary to 
install and remove the equipment from Dalia's office. 155 Despite the 
self-restraint exercised by the FBI, however; the majority should 
have considered that a secret entry of private premises by the police 
is an invasion of privacy regardless of what the police do once inside. 
While non-trespassory eavesdropping penetrates only that expecta-
tion of privacy that an individual has with respect to· his spoken 
words, entries enable intruding officers to examine personal papers 
and effects that would not be disclosed by non-trespassory surveil-
lance. Even if the police exercise self-restraint by adhering to the sole 
purpose of installing equipment, and consequently conduct a less 
aggravated invasion than a traditional rummaging search, they 
nevertheless have intruded on the occupant's privacy. Personal items 
. are likely to come within the plain view of police while they inspect 
the premises for a suitable place to install eavesdropping devices. As 
aptly noted by Justice Stevens in his dissent, covert entries 
aggravate the search and intrude upon property and privacy 
interests which.have independent social value unrelated to confiden-
tial speech. The Dalia majority's failure to consider this important 
constitutional issue is disturbing. Instead, it simply ignored the 
observations discussed above and shrouded the police in a sweeping 
cloak of authority to enter private premises whenever they deem it 
necessary to effectuate a Title III order. 
The majority supported its position that police need not obtain 
permission to enter private premises by reasoning that such judicial 
approval would amount to "empty formalism."156 Because all magis-
trates know that when they authorize bugging an entry will be 
necessary, there is no reason to require them to grant specific 
155. The majority was satisfied with the conduct of the FBI agents in that they 
entered Dalia's office only twice, once to install the bug and once to remove it. 
This rationale is misconceived because the issue was not whether the FBI 
agents acted with restraint upon entering the office, but whether they had the 
right to be there in the first place in light of the fact that no probable cause 
determination was made that the entry was necessary to conduct the 
investigation. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (this Court "has 
never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected 
to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to 
the least intrusive means consistent with that end ") Id. at 356-57. See text 
accompanying note 41 supra. 
156. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.s. 238, 258 (1979>. 
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approval for that entry. The majority failed to consider, however, 
that when the question of whether a covert entry is necessary is left 
to the discretion of the police, thereby circumventing the require-
ment that a neutral magistrate be interposed between the citizen 
and police,t57 there is no opportunity for the judge to issue a warrant 
tailored to meet the demands of the situation. Therefore, there is no 
assurance that the police will conduct the invasion in the least 
obtrusive manner possible, as specifically required by Title III. The 
Court failed to recognize that individual privacy can best be 
protected from unnecessary intrusions if the issuing judge is capable 
of maintaining supervision over the entry. ISS Because judicial 
supervision is the only means of ensuring that a covert entry does 
not exceed its limited purpose of installing necessary devices, that 
supervision constitutes more than mere "empty formalism." 
The majority's decision also creates a grave risk that surrepti-
tious entries will be accomplished when they are not necessary to 
intercept communications. The police now have unlimited discretion 
to enter whenever they obtain a Title III authorization to intercept 
oral communications. This may prompt police to obtain such 
authorization even when a traditional wiretap will suffice to obtain 
the needed evidence. 159 If covert entries are to be conducted, there 
should at least be a requirement that the police make a specific 
showing that an entry is necessary. As suggested by some courts, the 
police may have other motives for entering in addition to the seizure 
of conversations. 16o Entries entail inspection of the premises which 
often bring personal papers and effects within the plain view of 
police. To better protect individual privacy from arbitrary intrusions 
by police, a more appropriate view is that fourth amendment 
protections against physical trespass do not disappear merely 
because a probable cause showing has been made for the gathering of 
oral evidence. 
Finally, in holding that law enforcement agents who obtain Title 
III authorization to intercept communications need not obtain 
judicial approval for covert entries, the majority failed to consider 
157. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948>. 
158. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (in conducting a search, 
police must be compelled to observe precise limits established in advance by a 
specific court order); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 m.c. Cir. 1970) 
(judicial officer must determine what limitation and specification of entry may 
be appropriate and reasonable>. 
159. That wiretapping is often sufficient to conduct an investigation is evidenced by 
the fact that telephone taps account for most instances of electronic surveil-
lance. See National Wiretap Commissioll Report. Electrollic SI//'['eillallc(' 15 
(1976>. 
160. See, e.g., Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637. 643 (4th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1977l. 
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that it would be no great hardship for the police to obtain such 
approval. Because secret entries must be planned in advance, the 
police certainly have time to apprise the issuing judge of that plan. 
In view of the Court's recognition that the preferable approach would 
be for police to obtain explicit judicial approval, it should have 
recognized that the burden of obtaining a warrant to enter is not 
likely to frustrate the governmental interest in effective law 
enforcement. 161 As noted by the District of Columbia Circuit, "the 
minor incremental burden involved in obtaining proper judicial 
authorization for the particular invasions of privacy at issue here is 
not sufficient justification for dispensing with a fundamental fourth 
amendment requirement."162 There is no reason, therefore, why a 
requirement that police obtain judicial permission prior to entering 
private premises would not accommodate both the legitimate goals of 
law enforcement and the individual's right to privacy in the area of 
electronic surveillance. 
The decision in Dalia is consistent with a discernable trend in 
the Supreme Court towards a narrow interpretation of the fourth 
amendment and a concomitant limitation on the individual's right to 
privacy. Dalia is not the only instance in recent years in which the 
Court has approved of serious invasions of privacy not expressly 
authorized by Congress. In United States v. Ramsey,163 the Court 
upheld the right of postal inspectors to open private mail without 
probable cause to believe it contained contraband. In United States v. 
New York Telephone CO.,I64 the Court upheld the use of pen register 
surveillance even though Congress did not authorize the use of such 
devices in Title III. 165 In Dalia the Court went one step further by 
finding an implicit grant of executive power in Title III. 
D. Impact of Dalia on Eavesdropping Orders Issued 
by Maryland Judges 
While Dalia has significant ramifications on interception orders 
issued by federal courts under Title III, it has substantially less 
161. Application of United States, 563 F.2d 637, 644-45 (4th Cir. 1977). Because law 
enforcement agents must obtain a Title III order before they begin to intercept 
communications, it is difficult to imagine how a requirement that they obtain 
explicit approval to enter at that time would frustrate their investigation. 
162. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 164-65 m.c. Cir. 1977), 
163. 431 U.s. 606 (1977). 
164. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
165. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register device, which 
records the numbers dialed on a telephone but does not intercept conversations, 
is not a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment). 
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impact on eavesdropping orders issued by Maryland state courtS. 166 
Unlike Title III, Maryland's statutory law governing wiretaps and 
electronic surveillance contains a provision that authorizes entries to 
install eavesdropping equipment. 167 Had Dalia held that Title III does 
not authorize covert entries, Maryland's provision authorizing such 
entries would have been jeopardized. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has held that "under no circumstances is [a state 
eavesdropping law] enforceable if it is less restrictive than the 
federal statute so that it grants the governing power more rights at 
the expense of its citizens."I66 Therefore, if Title III did not authorize 
entries, it would follow that Maryland would be powerless to 
authorize entries as well.' 
Dalia's further holding that police who obtain Title III author-
ization to intercept communications have implied permission to 
conduct entries has no impact on interception orders issued under 
Maryland law. While Maryland law does authorize entries, it also 
provides that such entries may not be conducted without a court 
order.169 Because a state wiretap law that is more closely circum-
scribed than Title III in granting eavesdrop authority is certainly 
permissible,170 it is clear that despite the Supreme Court's holding in 
Dalia, there can be no entry made pursuant to an order issued by a 
Maryland state court unless the police obtain prior judicial author-
ization. 
166. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -412 (1980). In Maryland a 
judge of a circuit court or the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City may issue an 
order authorizing the interception of communications under conditions substan-
tially identical to Title III. See id. at §§ 10:....408(c), 10-401(8). See also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2516(2) (1970). 
167. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-412 (1980). Although this section does 
not authorize covert entries directly, it does so by implication in that it 
punishes only those who enter private premises to install eavesdropping 
equipment without a court order. 
168. State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 271, 292 A.2d 86, 94 (1972). 
169. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-412 (1980). This section provides that 
any person who breaks and enters any premises with the intent to install or 
remove eavesdropping equipment, without a court order, is guilty of a felony 
and may be imprisoned for not more than ten years. Apparently, this section 
does not exempt police officers from its scope. Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection, 
and Prognosis of Maryland's New Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law, 8 
U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 217 (1979). 
170. State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 272, 292 A.2d 86, 94 (1972). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of Title III means 
that any person seeking to suppress evidence obtained as a result of 
a covert entry accomplished under a valid Title III order will have to 
depend on a legislative amendment prohibiting such entries in order 
to have that evidence excluded at trial. Because Congress and the 
states have the authority to ensure greater protection of individual 
privacy than that provided by the Constitution, they clearly have the 
power to proscribe secret entries conducted for the purpose of 
installing eavesdropping devices. In regard to the Dalia Court's 
sanctioning of covert entries achieved without judicial approval, the 
Court has made a policy decision favoring the governmental interest 
in law enforcement over the citizen's right to privacy. To paraphrase 
Justice Brennan, the Court has permitted a search and seizure to be 
conducted without a warrant. 171 In light of the history of Title III, 
which evidences a great concern for privacy rights, a legislative 
amendment prohibiting unauthorized entries can be expected. 
Theodore Scott Basik 
171. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1979) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
